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field for analysis with regard to arms transfer diplomacy
between the major arms suppliers and their respective
clients, the combatants. On one end of a spectrum, there
is the titanic, brutal eight-year-long struggle between
Iran and Iraq that resulted in at least a million battlefield
deaths, in which the resupply of arms to the combatants
comprised something like 20% of the total of global
arms sales over a period of several years. On the other
end, there were the brief skirmishes between El Salva-
dor and Honduras and between Tanzania and Uganda,
neither of which involved truly significant intrawar arms
transfers.
For each of their cases, the authors provide a four-
phased analysis: (1) the background to the war, its
causes, and the diplomatic runup to the initiation of
hostilities; (2) the prewar balance of power and sources
of weapons on both sides; (3) the patterns of weapons
acquisitions in the period immediately preceding the
war; (4) the course of the war itself and the relationship
between diplomacy and intrawar arms flows. Each case
study hews closely to this format, and the result is an
excellent comparison of the wars, which interweaves the
course of the wars themselves, their contextual diploma-
cies, and the flow of weapons. As a basis for compari-
son, the authors examine symmetric and asymmetric
patterns of supplier behavior as applied to arms resup-
ply and embargoes (which provides a picture of which,
if either, side of the war is advantaged or disadvantaged
by arms resupply diplomacy), which patterns are related
to prewar advantages on one side or another with regard
to weapons, negotiations during the war over weapons
resupply, and finally the wars' outcomes. The authors
are then able to hypothesize about the factors leading to
deescalation of conflict: arms supply strongly favoring
one side (particularly defenders), dependence on single
suppliers, high war attrition and painful stalemate, and
embargoes and international pressures.
Of particular interest are the analyses in the various
cases of the mixed motives of the various big-power
arms producer states that must decide whether or not to
conduct arms resupply operations on behalf of erstwhile
client states. There are commercial motives; but also, a
major power may wish to see a certain state win or at
least not lose a war so as (1) to bolster its own image of
power, credibility, or reliability; (2) to bolster existing
relationships with combatants or third parties; (3) to test
and prove weapons or doctrines under fire; or (4) to
forestall resort to nuclear weapons or outside interven-
tion. By the same token, suppliers may refuse resupply
for fear of being drawn into open-ended commitments,
depleting their own weapons stocks, exacerbating con-
flicts with big-power rivals or with worried allies, vio-
lating principles of legal or ethical restraint, allowing
capture of classified technologies, and so on. There are
excellent discussions of these dilemmas, for instance,
with respect to U.S. policies toward Israel in 1973 and
Pakistan in 1965, Soviet policies toward Iraq after 1980
and Ethiopia during the Horn War, and the crucial
nature of U.S. arms assistance to Britain during the
Falklands War.
Among the authors' conclusions, to the extent al-
lowed by the small sample size and the diversity of the
cases, are that arms suppliers have relatively little lever-
age over the outcome of hostilities but that the effect of
arms supplies on the level of hostility and the occurrence
of negotiated settlements varied across cases. Arms
deliveries were seen clearly as a factor in decisions to go
to war, because of considerations about military superi-
ority and perceptions of changes in the balance of
power. Arms deliveries were seen as generally having
prolonged and intensified the fighting in many cases.
And in general, arms embargoes tended to have stron-
ger effects on short wars and those fought with more
sophisticated equipment (Arab-Israel and India-Paki-
stan), while economic embargoes ultimately had more
effect in longer wars (Iran-Iraq) and those among very
poor recipients (Tanzania-Uganda, El Salvador-Hondu-
ras). Finally, warring parties were found usually able to
find new, albeit probably inferior, arms sources in time
to keep most wars going despite efforts to stop the
fighting by big-power arms suppliers.
Pennsylvania State University ROBERT E. HARKAVY
European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Per-
spectives in Europe. Edited by Walter Carlsnaes and
Steve Smith. London: Sage, 1994. 312p. $22.95 paper.
It has by now become a commonplace in the study of
international relations that the end of the Cold War
should lead to a reexamination of international relations
theories. For better or worse, such a reexamination is
now in full swing, with the principal focus of debate
being theories of international systems. By contrast,
theories of foreign policymaking have largely escaped
this perestroika, a fact that makes the appearance of this
book a welcome one; for it is "concerned primarily with
foreign policy theory," the aim being "to examine the
extent to which the main theories of foreign policy can
explain two sets of developments: the end of the Cold
War in Europe and the increasing integration of West
European states" (p. 1). Which, if any, theories stand up
to this test, and how, if at all, should they be modified?
In a symposium volume such as this, one should not
expect complete unity of views. Understandably, the
authors cover a number of different empirical domains:
European states, multinational corporations, and the
European Union. Less understandably, though, there is
little-to-no agreement on just what theories of foreign
policy are or should be under examination. The problem
here is not, as might be imagined, a surfeit of theories
but an almost extreme paucity. One finds only the most
cursory references to standard theories of decision mak-
ing, of bureaucratic politics, of cybernetic processes, of
psychodynamics, or of learning. Instead, the various
studies tend to operate with a notion of foreign policy
making as zweckrational activity by individual actors,
who, subjected to pressures and opportunities both at
home and abroad, pursue goals as best they can. Thus,
"the main theories of foreign policy" are, in fact, not
examined; and the stated purpose of the book is not
achieved.
In and of itself, this failure would not be dire. After all,
one might still expect that the individual studies would
shed light on particular foreign-policy-related events
and processes, even if they have little to say about
foreign policymaking in the abstract. To some degree,
this hope is borne out, notably in the chapters on Nordic
reactions to the Soviet coup attempt, on Swedish candi-
dacy for the European Community, and on Eastern
European policies during the final years of the Cold War
(by Hans Mouritzen, Bengt Sundelius, and Olav F.
Knudsen, respectively). Each of these chapters contains
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a fairly developed treatment of primary source material
and shows quite nicely how government leaders
changed their policies over time. Unfortunately, this
empirical, richness is not accompanied by an equally
satisfactory set of explanations. Instead, one finds ad
hoc descriptions: "concern for the Swedish image"; "the
policy-makers concluded that their traditional policy
was ineffective in dealing with the problem, as presently
defined, making the problem worse, generating new
problems (i.e. in the domestic election arena) and cost-
ing much more than anticipated"; "in a most natural
way, however, given the circumstances of Eastern and
Central Europe at this time, the statements gave evi-
dence of a process of 'structural probing': agents pre-
sented tentative or conditional analyses" (pp. 171, 193,
221).
The other individual studies are rather more difficult
to characterize. On the one hand, they contain few
theoretical claims about how foreign policy is supposed
to be made. On the other hand, their empirical claims
are couched at a high-enough order of abstraction as to
be of little use for either theory evaluation or theory
description. As a result, it is difficult to tell how conclu-
sions in these studies are arrived at or even what they
might mean for purposes of research. How, for example,
is one to assess the claim that "the process of European
integration may be seen as a two-level game" (p. 140)
when the author never says what the game is about,
who the players are, or what other ways of "seeing"
integration are ruled out by adopting the game meta-
phor? How is one to understand a chapter in which
"foreign economic policy theory" is criticized for an
"orthodox distinction between what is considered eco-
nomics and what is politics" (p. 76) when, three pages
later, "the European context" is adduced to conclude
that "it is plainly nonsense that the theoretical apparatus
of foreign policy does not include foreign economic
policy"? One is forced to conclude that the volume fails
to achieve both the goal its editors set for themselves
and the more modest one of contributing in some
fashion to our understanding of foreign policy phenom-
ena in Europe.
These shortcomings are too systematic to be attribut-
able to time pressures or the inevitable difficulties of
coordinating over a dozen scholars. Rather, they seem to
stem from three types of confusion, each of which by
itself would be debilitating for serious research. First,
most of the contributors to the volume conflate theoret-
ical perspectives with individual theories, attempting to
use the former to analyze historical or contemporaneous
phenomena. For example, we are told that both Kant
and Keohane are "liberal theorists" and that the "liberal
perspective" is better than others at accounting for
"NATO decisions on military strategy and force deploy-
ments" (50, 56-57). Small wonder, then, that the indi-
vidual chapters cannot say much about which theories
"explain"—or even are remotely relevant for describ-
ing—foreign policy phenomena.
Second, almost without exception, every chapter in
the volume conflates theories of foreign policymaking
and theories of international relations tout court. This
begins as early as page 3, in which "theories in the
foreign policy analysis literature" are transmuted three
lines later into "theories in the subject of international
relations." We thus end up with "an analysis of foreign
policy behavior . . . in the tradition of the realist school
of thinking" or an invitation to "explore the potentials of
neo-realist foreign policy analysis" (pp. 123, 259). One
result of this conceptual slide is that instead of studying
the details of foreign policymaking phenomena (e.g.,
how thinking comes to be "grooved" how individuals
become "hardball" politicians), the authors end up with
the kind of high-order abstractions (e.g., "coordina-
tion," "supportive behavior") mentioned above.
Third, there is a pervasive confusion between meta-
theory and theory. This again begins at the very start of
the volume, in which, only a few pages after having
described the task of theory evaluation assigned to the
contributors, one of the editors then goes on to cite the
"agency-structure debate" as implying that it will be
difficult, if not impossible, for theories of foreign policy
analysis to be cumulated or integrated (16-20). To be
sure, the other editor disagrees with this stance (285-7);
and perhaps as a result of this split, several of the
contributors feel obliged to interpret their empirical
material as bearing on the "debate," rather than on
particular theories of foreign policy making (e.g., pp.
200, 221). One does not have to be an adherent of
"positivism" as variously defined by one of the editors
("a notion of truth . . . that can be approached," "one
truth, one world," "data and their neutrality," pp. 12,
18) to see that the attempt at bringing data to bear on
metatheory will result, at best, in the sort of jargonistic
descriptions quoted.
This analysis should not be taken as implying that
there is no possibility of developing useful—indeed,
critical—theories of foreign policymaking. Considerable
work is going on in this vein, some of it explicitly aimed
at understanding Europe in the post-Cold War era.
Much of this research, however, is "grounded" (as the
term is used in sociological theory) and thus does not
proceed in the top-down, metatheory-first fashion of
this volume. Perhaps, in several years time, the editors
could be persuaded to compile a second, more modest,
collection.
Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva
DAVID SYLVAN
Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes and
States in the Post-Hegemonic Era. Edited by Philip G.
Cerny. Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1993. 234p. $59.95.
States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From
Bretton Woods to the 1990s. By Eric Helleiner. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1994. 244p. $29.95.
The loosening of national regulations on banking,
collapse of the post-World War II fixed exchange rate
system, creation of new kinds of financial instruments
and new capital markets, and sheer size of international
transactions in currency, stocks, bonds, and other credit
instruments have all led financial issues out of obscurity
and onto the agendas of policymakers, analysts, and
ordinary people. There is genuine concern over the
impact of open financial markets on any government's
ability to implement its policies, given the magnitude
and speed of response from global financial markets.
The response in the political science community has
been a new wave of political-economic analysis of fi-
nance, from both a comparative and international per-
spective.
The books under review here—Eric Helleiner's States
and the Reemergence of Global Finance and Philip Cerny's
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